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1 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: NIE 11-3/8 Version for the President

1. Following on to our conversation Friday about NIE 11-3/8, I gave additional thought to which items we should include in a volume tailored for the President. I lean heavily on [redacted] April 1980 working paper on this subject. It certainly isn't a full model for us, but there are a lot of good points in it. Perhaps the five or six pages are oriented towards what will go into the NIE [redacted] is drafting, but much of the rest highlights issues that we should attack. Some of them are issues we have not addressed directly in past 3/8s. (S/NF)

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2. In no particular order of sequence, I would suggest the following issues might be considered for inclusion in the Presidential volume:

a. What is the philosophy behind Soviet strategic force construction--vis-a-vis the United States; vis-a-vis other nuclear powers?

b. What is the relationship of Soviet strategic forces to other military forces?

c. What is the relationship of the Soviet strategic forces to foreign policy?

d. What issues or decision points are Soviet leaders facing today with respect to their strategic forces?

e. What motivates the Soviets to participate in arms control negotiations in general, SALT II in particular?

[redacted]

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f. What linkages are the Soviets making or likely to insist on between strategic force arms limitations and others?

g. What are the principal decisions the Soviet leaders will confront in the face of possible abandonment of SALT II and at least as strong a U.S. strategic program as presently envisaged--that is, what options will the Soviet leaders have?

h. What decisions will the Soviet leaders face if an arms control agreement approximating SALT II is effected?

i. What then are the incentives and disincentives for the Soviet leaders to persist in SALT II?

j. What do the Soviet leaders really expect to obtain out of SALT II?

k. Soviet strategic force program budgets:

- As a part of the whole military budgets.
- Expenditure trends in recent years.
- Economic considerations and their degree of constraint or lack thereof.

l. New developments and the implications of their capability for U.S. systems.

m. Vulnerabilities and deficiencies of Soviet programs.

- Opportunities for U.S. systems.

n. Areas of Soviet concern regarding U.S. capabilities and their impact on Soviet systems.

o. Significant uncertainties in understanding Soviet strategic programs.

p. Trends in static and quasi-dynamic measures of U.S. and Soviet strategic force comparisons. [redacted] 25X1

q. Implications of the anti-ballistic missile programs. (S/NF)

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